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Summary
The air cargo system is a complex, multi-faceted network that handles a vast
amount of freight, packages, and mail carried aboard passenger and all-cargo aircraft.
The air cargo system is vulnerable to several security threats including potential plots
to place explosives aboard aircraft; illegal shipments of hazardous materials; criminal
activities such as smuggling and theft; and potential hijackings and sabotage by
persons with access to aircraft. While it is generally agreed that full screening of all
cargo placed on aircraft is not currently feasible, several procedural and technology
initiatives have been proposed to enhance air cargo security and deter terrorist and
criminal threats.  Procedural initiatives include proposals to:  expand the “known
shipper” program; increase cargo inspections; increase physical security of air cargo
facilities; increase oversight of air cargo operations; provide security training for
cargo workers; and tighten controls over access to aircraft during cargo operations.
Technology being considered to improve air cargo security includes tamper-resistant
and tamper-evident packaging and containers; explosive detection systems and other
cargo screening technologies; blast-resistant cargo containers; and biometric systems
for worker identification and access control. 
The Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA, P.L. 107-71) contains
general provisions for cargo screening, inspection, and security measures.  Cargo
carried in passenger airplanes must be screened or its security otherwise ensured.  In
practice, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has relied heavily on
“known shipper” programs to prevent shipments of cargo from unknown sources on
passenger aircraft. ATSA also mandated that  a security plan for all-cargo operations
was to be put in place as soon as possible, but aviation security initiatives in the
aftermath of the September 11, 2001, attacks primarily focused on enhancing the
security of passenger operations.  
Air cargo security consequently became a significant issue during the 108th
Congress.  To enhance all-cargo security, Vision 100 (P.L. 108-176) expanded the
current program for arming pilots to include all-cargo pilots.  Additionally, the
FY2005 Homeland Security Appropriations Act (P.L. 108-334) included language
calling for a threefold increase in the physical inspections or screening of cargo
placed on passenger aircraft.  Finally, the National Intelligence Reform Act of 2004
(P.L. 108-458) included several provisions pertaining to cargo security that establish
a pilot program for evaluating the deployment of blast resistant cargo containers;
promote the research, development, and deployment of enhanced air cargo security
technology; evaluate international air cargo threats; and set a deadline of September
2005 for finalizing proposed rules pertaining to air cargo security.  Those proposed
rules, disclosed by the TSA in November 2004, would intensify security measures
for cargo operations involving both passenger and all-cargo operations and is seen
as the core regulatory framework for implementing their strategic plan for air cargo
security.  That plan centers around risk-based assessments and targeted physical
screening of cargo shipments based on risk combined with enhanced measures for
controlling  access to cargo operations areas and improved vetting of shippers and
freight forwarders. This report will be updated as needed.
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Overview of the Air Cargo System
The air cargo system is a complex, multi-faceted network responsible for
moving a vast amount of freight, express packages, and mail carried aboard
passenger and all-cargo aircraft.  The air cargo system consists of a large, complex
distribution network linking manufacturers and shippers to freight forwarders to
airport sorting and cargo handling facilities where shipments are loaded and unloaded
from aircraft.  Business and consumer demand for fast, efficient shipment of goods
has fueled the rapid growth of the air cargo industry over the past 25 years.  In
FY2003, about 14.3 billion revenue ton miles1 (RTMs) of cargo2 were shipped by air
within the United States, and another 18.5 billion RTMs of cargo were shipped by
air on international flights to and from the United States.  The volume of air cargo
operations since FY1999 and the forecast volume of air cargo through 2016 is  shown
in Figure 1.  It is estimated that air cargo shipments, expressed in terms of revenue
ton milage (RTMs), will increase by 50% domestically, and by 110% internationally
by FY2016 compared to FY2003 levels.3  In 2002, air cargo comprised about 0.3%
by weight of all freight movement in the United States.4  While this percentage may
seem small, it is much greater than the 0.07% percent of freight that traveled by air
in 1965, indicating that not only is the volume of air cargo increasing significantly,
but so is the percent of total freight movements that travel by air.  Also, cargo
shipments by air comprise a significant percent of the total value of cargo shipments.
In fact, in 2002, while air freight movements accounted for only about 0.3% of total
domestic freight shipments by weight, these shipments accounted for 4.3% of the
total value of freight shipped within the United States.  Also,  air cargo accounted for
26.2% of international trade by value, surpassed only by maritime shipping which
accounted for 41.9% of the import/export value of cargo in 2002 reflecting the
importance of air cargo in the international trade of high-value goods.5  While the
downturn in the aviation industry between 2000 and 2002 temporarily slowed the
pace of growth in air cargo, shipments surpassed pre-9/11 levels in 2003.  This
increased demand reflects the importance of addressing air cargo security needs as
the size and complexity of the air cargo system continues to expand.
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6 See Statement of Admiral James M. Loy Under Secretary of Transportation for Security
Before the Subcommittee on Aviation Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation U.S. Senate, February 5, 2003.
7 Greg Schneider.  “Terror Risk Cited for Cargo Carried on Passenger Jets; 2 Reports List
Security Gaps.”  The Washington Post, June 10, 2002.
Source: Federal Aviation Administration. FAA Aerospace Forecasts Fiscal Years
2005-2016.
Given the sheer volume of cargo that must be expediently processed and loaded
on aircraft, it has been generally argued that full electronic screening of all air cargo,
as is now required of checked passenger baggage, is simply not feasible with
available screening technologies and procedures.6  In 2002, it was reported that TSA
computer models estimated that if full physical screening is implemented, only 4%
of the daily volume of freight at airports could be processed due to the time that
would be required to breakdown shipments, inspect them, and reassemble them for
transport.7  Since that time, considerable efforts have been made to increase the
amount of cargo placed on passenger airliners that is screened and advance screening
technologies to address concerns over the screening of cargo.  What has resulted
since is best described as a slow evolution of increasing inspections and screening
of air cargo shipments placed on passenger aircraft since 2002.  These inspections
and screening operations are conducted by the airlines and freight shippers under the
oversight of the TSA.  While the TSA does not divulge the percentage of cargo that
undergoes physical inspection, language in the FY2005 Homeland Security
Appropriations Act (P.L. 108-334) calls for at least tripling the amount of cargo
placed on passenger aircraft that is inspected.   FY2006 appropriations language (P.L.
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procurement, and deployment of screening systems –  to inspect and screen air cargo
on passenger aircraft and increase the percentage of cargo inspected beyond the level
mandated in the FY2005 appropriations measure.  Along similar lines, the National
Intelligence Reform Act of 2004 (P.L. 108-458) require the TSA to pursue screening
technologies and enhance security procedures to improve the inspection, screening,
and tracking of air cargo on passenger aircraft as recommended by the 9/11
Commission.  
While the primary focus has been on cargo carried aboard passenger aircraft, air
cargo security is also a challenge for all-cargo operators.  The largest all-cargo
operators in the United States include FedEx, UPS, Airborne Express, and ASTAR
Air Cargo (formerly DHL Airways).  Figure 2 shows the distribution of air cargo
operations among passenger and all-cargo aircraft.  International operations make up
about half of the total system-wide air cargo operations in the United States.
Historically, about 27% of revenue ton miles (RTMs) of domestic air cargo travels
aboard passenger aircraft within the United States, 45% of international cargo RTMs
to and from the United States is carried aboard passenger aircraft.  The percentage
of air cargo carried on passenger aircraft has dropped somewhat since September 11,
2001, with an estimated 26% of domestic RTMs and 37% of international air cargo
RTMs  carried on passenger aircraft in 2003.  This slight reduction in the distribution
of air cargo to passenger flights is primarily attributable to a post-9/11 restriction on
mail parcels weighing more than 16 ounces, and a prohibition against carrying cargo
from unknown shippers aboard passenger aircraft.  A post-9/11 reduction in
passenger flights to certain locations has also contributed to an increased reliance on
all-cargo aircraft for cargo shipments.













Figure 2. Distribution of Air Cargo Revenue Ton Miles by 
Type of Operation (FY1999 - FY2016)
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8 Greg Schneider.  “Terror Risk Cited for Cargo Carried on Passenger Jets; 2 Reports List
Security Gaps.”  The Washington Post, June 10, 2002.
9 United Kingdom Air Accidents Investigation Branch.  Report on the accident to Boeing
747-121, N739PA at Lockerbie, Dumfriesshire, Scotland on 21 December 1988 (Aircraft
Accident Report No 2/90 (EW/C1094)), July 1990.
Since September 11, 2001, a variety of air cargo security measures have been
put in place or are under consideration.  The purpose of these security measures is to
mitigate: (1) the risks associated with placing cargo on passenger and all-cargo
aircraft; and (2) the high level of access to aircraft during cargo operations.  This
report will examine the key security risks associated with air cargo operations and
options for mitigating these risks.
Air Cargo Security Risks
Potential risks associated with air cargo security include introduction of
explosive and incendiary devices in cargo placed aboard aircraft; shipment of
undeclared or undetected hazardous materials aboard aircraft; cargo crime including
theft and smuggling; and aircraft hijackings and sabotage by individuals with access
to aircraft.
Explosives and Incendiary Devices.  Undetected explosive or incendiary
devices placed in air cargo are potential threats to aircraft.  Experts have warned that
air cargo may be a potential target for terrorists because screening and inspection of
air cargo is currently not as extensive as required screening of passengers and
checked baggage.  Cargo carried aboard passenger aircraft may be at particular risk
since passenger aircraft are generally regarded as highly attractive targets to terrorists
and have been attacked in the past.  It has been reported that TSA considers the
likelihood of a terrorist bombing of a passenger airplane to be between 35% and 65%
based on 2002 intelligence reports, and TSA believes that cargo is either likely to
become, or already is, the primary aviation target for terrorists in the short term.8 
However, other terrorism experts regard placing explosives in air cargo as less
appealing to terrorists because typically a specific flight cannot be targeted without
the assistance of an individual with access to aircraft.  Furthermore, experts generally
believe that all-cargo aircraft are less appealing targets to terrorists because an attack
against an all-cargo aircraft is not likely to generate the degree of public and media
attention that a bombing of a commercial passenger aircraft would have.
 The December 22, 2001 attempted shoe bombing aboard a American Airlines
Boeing 767 on a trans-Atlantic Paris to Miami flight has heightened concerns over
possible terrorist bombings of U.S. aircraft in the wake of the terrorist attacks of
September 11, 2001.  Historically, bombings of U.S. airliners have been rare and
have mostly involved bombs placed in either the aircraft passenger cabin or in
checked passenger baggage.  The most catastrophic bombing of a U.S. airliner was
the December 21, 1988 crash of Pan Am flight 103, a Boeing 747, over Lockerbie,
Scotland that was attributed to an explosive device placed in a baggage container in
the airplane’s forward hold.9  Investigation of the deadliest bombing of a passenger
aircraft, the June 23, 1985 downing of Air India flight 182 off the coast of Ireland,
similarly revealed evidence of an explosive device that was most likely introduced
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10 Canadian Aviation Bureau Safety Board.  Aviation Occurrence, Air India Boeing
747-237B VT-EFO, Cork, Ireland 110 Miles West, June 23, 1985.
11 Affidavit of Assistant Special Agent in Charge, Terry D. Turchie, Before the U.S. District
Court, District of Montana, April 3, 1996.
12 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States.  The 9/11 Commission
Report.  New York, NY: W. W. Norton & Company. 
13 Ibid.
14 Hazardous materials or dangerous goods include explosives; gases; flammable liquids and
solids; oxidizers and organic peroxides; toxic materials and infectious substances;
radioactive materials; corrosive materials; and other miscellaneous dangerous goods (e.g.
asbestos). 
in checked baggage and placed in the aircraft’s forward cargo hold.10   The most
notable event involving detonation of an explosive device transported as cargo
aboard an airliner in the United States was the November 15, 1979 explosion aboard
an American Airlines Boeing 727 that made a successful emergency landing at
Dulles Airport following the incident.  Investigation revealed that the device was
contained in a parcel shipped by U.S. mail that the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI) linked to convicted “Unabomber,” Theodore Kaczynski.11
While using cargo as a means to place explosive or incendiary devices aboard
aircraft has historically been rare, heightened screening of passengers, baggage, and
aircraft may make cargo a more attractive means for terrorists to place these devices
aboard aircraft, including all-cargo aircraft as well as passenger aircraft, in the future.
Investigations have suggested that  al Qaeda terrorists had an interest in bombing all-
cargo aircraft prior to September 11, 2001, and were planning to bomb U.S.-bound
cargo flights in an operation run out of the Philippines.12  Given al Qaeda’s continued
interest in bombing aircraft and indications that they have already considered placing
bombs in cargo, the specific vulnerability of air cargo is an issue of particular
concern.
However, as previously noted, some terrorism experts believe that placing
explosives or incendiary devices in cargo may be less appealing because it would be
difficult to target specific flights without the cooperation of individuals with access
to aircraft such as cargo workers.  Thus, increased efforts to perform background
checks of workers with access to aircraft and increased physical security around air
cargo operations may further mitigate the threat of explosives and incendiary devices.
Additionally, the use of hardened cargo containers capable of withstanding internal
bomb blasts are being evaluated and may also provide a means of mitigating the risks
of explosives and incendiary devices.  The 9/11 Commission specifically
recommended the deployment of at least one hardened cargo container in each
passenger aircraft to mitigate the potentially catastrophic consequences of a bomb
carried in air cargo.13  The National Intelligence Reform Act of 2004 (P.L. 108-458)
calls for establishing a pilot program to evaluate this concept.  
Hazardous Materials.14  Despite increased Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA) and Department of Transportation (DOT) oversight and enforcement efforts,
undeclared and undetected shipments of hazardous materials continues to pose a
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15 U.S. General Accounting Office.  Aviation Safety: Undeclared Air Shipments of
Dangerous Goods and DOT’s Enforcement Approach. (GAO-03-22, January 2003).
16 National Transportation Safety Board.  Aircraft Accident Report: In-Flight Fire and
Impact with Terrain, ValuJet Airlines, Flight 592,DC-9-32, N904VJ, Everglades, Near
Miami, Florida, May 11, 1996 (AAR-97/06).
17 U.S. General Accounting Office.  Aviation Safety: Undeclared Air Shipments of
Dangerous Goods and DOT’s Enforcement Approach.  GAO-03-22, January 2003.
18 U.S. General Accounting Office.  Aviation Security: Vulnerabilities and Potential
Improvements for the Air Cargo System. GAO-03-334, December, 2002.  FIA International
Research, Ltd. Contraband, Organized Crime and the Threat to the Transportation and
Supply Chain Function.  September 2001.
significant safety problem for air carriers.  Most explosives and gases are prohibited
aboard aircraft, however many properly handled hazardous materials are permitted
aboard passenger and all-cargo aircraft within specified quantity limitations.15  
Risks are introduced when hazardous materials are not declared leading to the
potential transport of prohibited materials by air or improper handling of hazardous
goods during loading and while in transit.  The dangers of undetected and improperly
handled hazardous materials in air cargo shipments were highlighted by the May 11,
1996 crash of a ValuJet DC-9 in the Florida Everglades.  The National
Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) determined that improperly carried oxygen
generators ignited an intense fire in one of the airplane’s cargo holds leading to the
crash and issued several safety recommendations for improving the handling and
tracking of hazardous materials to prevent improper carriage aboard passenger
aircraft.16
While safety concerns regarding hazardous cargo shipments aboard passenger
aircraft are of particular concern, preventing unauthorized shipments of hazardous
materials is a challenge for all-cargo aircraft operators as well. About 75% of
hazardous materials shipped by aircraft are carried aboard all-cargo aircraft, while the
remaining 25% is shipped on passenger aircraft.17  Enhanced air cargo security
measures may also improve air cargo safety by increasing the detection of undeclared
hazardous materials.
Cargo Crime.  Cargo crimes include theft of goods transported as cargo, and
shipment and smuggling of contraband, counterfeit, and pirated goods through the
cargo distribution network.  It is estimated that direct losses due to cargo theft across
all transportation modes total between $10 and $25 billion annually in the United
States.18  The large range in this estimate reflects the fact that cargo theft is not a
specific crime category and therefore reliable statistics on cargo theft are unavailable.
Furthermore, many experts believe a large percentage of cargo theft is unreported.
The Cargo Theft Prevention Act, H.R. 785, introduced by Representative Stearns
seeks to improve the understanding and tracking of cargo crimes by requiring the
Department of Justice to establish a coordinated cargo theft crime database and
integrate and disseminate cargo theft information to federal, state, and local law
enforcement authorities.  The bill also would establish cargo theft as a specific crime
classification in the Uniform Crime Reporting System. 
CRS-7
19 U. S. General Accounting Office. Ibid; Department of Transportation, Office of the
Inspector General. Press Release: Six MIA Airport Employees Indicted for Stealing from
Checked Passenger Bags.  December 11, 2002.
20 FIA International Research, Ltd. Op cit.
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The large estimated level of cargo theft and other cargo crimes is indicative of
potential weaknesses in cargo security including air cargo security.  Specific
weaknesses in air cargo security have been highlighted in several high profile
investigations of cargo theft.  Major cargo and baggage theft rings have been
uncovered at JFK International Airport in New York, Logan International Airport in
Boston, and at Miami International Airport.19  In addition to theft, smuggling is  a
problem for air cargo security.  Smuggling of contraband, counterfeit, and pirated
goods undermines legal markets and reduces government tax and tariff  revenues.
Smuggling operations are often linked to organized crime, and may provide support
for terrorist activities.20  A large portion of cargo crime is either committed by or with
the assistance of cargo workers.  Therefore, increased security measures such as
conducting more stringent or more frequent background checks of cargo workers and
enhancing physical security of cargo operations areas are likely to reduce cargo
crimes and improve the capability to detect criminal activity in air cargo operations.
A review of transportation security needs for combating cargo crime identified six
key issues regarding cargo security:
! A lack of effective cargo theft reporting systems;
! Weaknesses in current transportation crime laws and prosecution;
! A lack of understanding regarding the nature of cargo crime by
governments and industry;
! Inadequate support for cargo theft task forces;
! A need to improve local law enforcement expertise on cargo theft;
and
! The need for more effective cargo security technology including
cargo tracking systems, tamper-evident and tamper-resistant seals,
high-speed screening devices, and integration of security technology
into supply chain management systems.21
Addressing these issues specific to cargo crime may also improve overall cargo
security and could deter terrorist threats to cargo shipments.  While these
recommendations are directed toward cargo crime issues in all modes of
transportation, they could be particularly applicable to air cargo security where other
security concerns such as explosive and incendiary device detection, hazardous
materials detection, and deterring hijackings and sabotage may also be addressed
through the implementation of tighter controls to deter cargo crime.
Aircraft Hijacking and Sabotage.  Individuals with access to aircraft may
pose a risk of potential hijackings and aircraft sabotage.  Instances of hijackings by
individuals with access to aircraft have been extremely rare, but include two
examples of particularly violent incidents by disgruntled individuals who had access
to aircraft that facilitated their plots.  A particularly dramatic hijacking attempt by an
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William Morrow & Co, 1997). 
23 National Transportation Safety Board.  Accident Brief, NTSB Identification:
DCA88MA008.  Available at [http://www.ntsb.gov].
24 Department of Homeland Security, Transportation Security Administration.  “Air Cargo
Security Requirements; Proposed Rule.”  Federal Register, (69) 217, 65258-65291.
individual with access to aircraft and cargo operations facilities occurred on April 7,
1994.22  An off-duty Federal Express flight engineer attempted to hijack a FedEx DC-
10 aircraft and crash it into the company’s Memphis, Tennessee headquarters.  The
hijacker boarded the airplane in Memphis under the guise of seeking free
transportation to San Jose, California.  His only luggage was a guitar case that
concealed hammers, mallets, a knife, and a spear gun.  At the time there was no
requirement or company procedure to screen or inspect personnel with access to
cargo aircraft or their baggage.  The flight crew thwarted the hijacker’s attempt to
take over the airplane by force and made a successful emergency landing in Memphis
despite serious injuries to all three flight crew members.  
Individuals have also used their access to aircraft credentials to bypass existing
security measures.  For example, on December 7, 1987, a PSA regional jet crashed
near San Luis Obispo, California killing all 43 people on board.23  Investigation
revealed that a disgruntled former USAir employee, recently fired for alleged theft,
used his employee identification, which had not been returned, to bypass airport
security with a loaded handgun.  At altitude, he shot his former supervisor who was
a passenger on the airplane. He then entered the flight deck, shot the two pilots, and
then shot himself after putting the airplane into a crash dive.  At the time, federal
regulations permitted airline employees to bypass airport security checkpoints.  
Since these incidents, airport and air cargo security regulations have been
tightened to establish better controls over aircraft access including background
checks and physical screening of individuals with access to aircraft.  Background
checks of workers with unescorted access to passenger aircraft was mandated under
ATSA, and background checks of workers with unescorted access to air cargo are
under consideration as part of proposed regulations issued by the TSA in November
2004.24  However, without full screening of air cargo and airport personnel, the
potential still exists for persons with access to aircraft to pass weapons inside the
secured areas of airports.  Under proposed regulations, crewmembers and individuals
carried aboard large all-cargo aircraft would be subject to pre-flight screening
conducted by either the TSA or, more typically, by the aircraft operator using
methods approved by the TSA and detailed in the operator’s security program.
Heightened security measures on passenger aircraft since September 11, 2001
could make all-cargo aircraft more attractive to terrorists seeking to hijack large
airplanes.  Currently, federal air marshals are not deployed on all-cargo aircraft, and
cargo airplanes are not required to have hardened cockpit doors so long as alterative
TSA-approved security measures are implemented to control access to the aircraft
and flight deck while the airplane is on the ground. Vision 100 (P.L. 108-176)
expanded the  Federal Flight Deck Officer program to include pilots of  all-cargo
aircraft.  This program trains and deputizes pilots to carry firearms to protect the
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25 Transport category airplanes include all jet-powered airplanes with 10 or more passenger
seats or weighing more than 12,500 pounds maximum takeoff weight (MTOW), and all
propeller-driven airplanes with 19 or more seats or weighing more than 19,000 pounds
MTOW.
26  U.S. General Accounting Office.  Post-September 11th Initiatives and Long-Term
Challenges.  Statement of Gerald L. Dillingham, Testimony Before the National
Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, April 1, 2003 (GAO-03-616T).
27 An indirect air carrier refers to an entity, such as a freight forwarder, that engages
indirectly in the air transportation of property on passenger aircraft (See Title 49 Code of
Federal Regulations, Chapter XII, Part 1544).
flight deck against a terrorist attack. (see CRS Report RL31674, Arming Pilots
Against Terrorism:  Implementation Issues for the Federal Flight Deck Officer
Program, by Bartholomew Elias.)
Sabotage by individuals with access to aircraft is also a potential risk, although
generally not considered a significant threat because of the high level of knowledge
regarding aircraft systems needed to sabotage flight critical systems, the levels of
redundancy of flight critical systems on modern transport category airplanes25, and
the existing capabilities to detect sabotage attempts through aircraft systems checks
and pre-flight inspections.  While numerous cases of sabotage by disgruntled
employees have been documented, these incidents of aircraft tampering have
typically been discovered during pre-flight inspections resulting in aircraft
groundings and delays and costly repairs, but have not resulted in catastrophes.  Such
incidents have not been linked to terrorism.  
Cargo Screening and Inspection
Screening and inspection of air cargo may be an effective means for detecting
explosives, incendiary devices, and hazardous materials in air cargo.  The Aviation
and Transportation Security Act (ATSA, P.L. 107-71) requires the screening of all
property, including mail and cargo, carried aboard passenger aircraft in the United
States.  In implementing the security procedures for cargo carried aboard passenger
airplanes, TSA has relied extensively on “known shipper” programs to prevent the
shipment of cargo from unknown sources aboard passenger aircraft.  ATSA also
specifies that, as soon as practicable, a system must be implemented to screen,
inspect, or otherwise ensure the security of all cargo transported in all-cargo aircraft
using methods such as those outlined in this report.  However, the General
Accounting Office (GAO) noted  that the TSA lacked specific long-term goals and
performance targets for cargo security.26  In response, the TSA has developed an air
cargo security strategic plan and has proposed comprehensive regulations designed
to enhance air cargo security.  The TSA’s strategy centers on risk-based assessments
and targeted physical screening of cargo based on risk as well as increased random
inspections of shipments.
Current aviation security regulations require that each passenger aircraft
operator and indirect air carrier27 develop a security program for acceptance and
screening of cargo to prevent or deter the carriage of unauthorized explosives or
incendiaries.  However, the volume of air cargo handled and the distributed nature
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30 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Transportation Security Administration.  Air
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of the air cargo system presents significant challenges for screening and inspecting
air cargo.  Presently, in the United States, about 50 air carriers transport air cargo on
passenger aircraft handling cargo from nearly 2 million shippers per day.28  About
80% of these shippers use freight forwarders who operate about 10,000 facilities
across the country.29  Since experts generally believe that 100% screening of all air
cargo is not a practical solution with currently available technology, security
programs have relied on pre-screening of cargo to identify shipments for physical
screening and inspection. 
The TSA is currently working toward fully implementing its Air Cargo Strategic
Plan which was released in November 2003.30  In keeping with the risk-based
approach of implementing  air cargo security measures typified in the known shipper
concept, the core elements of this plan consist of:  improving shipper and supply
chain security through improved vetting of shippers and freight forwarders;
enhancing cargo pre-screening processes; developing and deploying appropriate
screening technologies to conduct targeted air cargo inspections; and implementing
appropriate facility security measures.
“Known Shipper” Programs.   The principal means for pre-screening or
profiling cargo has been though use of “known shipper” programs.  Current
administration regulatory proposals seek to establish an industry-wide known shipper
database for vetting all shipments placed on passenger aircraft.31  Under a provision
in the Intelligence Reform Bill of 2004 (P.L. 108-458), the TSA was required to
finalize these proposed regulatory changes by September 2005 but has not yet done
so.  According to the TSA, about one-third of air carriers and indirect air carriers are
participating in the voluntary central database of known shippers to vet cargo
destined for passenger aircraft as required under ATSA.  Other air carriers and freight
forwarders currently use internal databases and security protocols approved by TSA
for determining whether shipments bound for a passenger airplane come from known
sources and that shippers have adequate security measures in place to protect the
integrity of those shipments.  These protocols are collectively known as “known
shipper” programs. 
Known shipper programs were created to establish procedures for differentiating
trusted shippers, known to a freight forwarder or air carrier through prior business
dealings, from unknown shippers who have conducted limited or no prior business
with a freight forwarder or air carrier.  Using this system, packages from unknown
shippers can then be identified for additional screening and inspection. Currently,
shipments from unknown sources are prohibited from passenger aircraft.
Additionally, air carriers and freight forwarders must refuse to transport any cargo
from shippers, including known shippers, that refuse to give consent for searching
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and  inspecting the cargo.  ATSA provides for use of known shipper programs as an
alternate means for ensuring the security of cargo carried aboard passenger aircraft
in lieu of screening of property by federal government employees prior to aircraft
boarding. 
The development of known shipper programs was prompted by industry experts
and Congress in the mid-1990s who recognized that increased controls over air cargo
shipments were needed to better ensure air cargo safety and security.  Key concerns
included the need for increased compliance with guidelines for the shipment of
hazardous materials and the need to deter terrorists from using cargo as a means to
place explosives or incendiary devices on aircraft.  In addition, congressional
hearings on the 1996 Valujet accident concluded that air cargo safety could only be
achieved through a comprehensive inspection program encompassing all components
of the air cargo network.32  
In December 1996, the FAA’s Aviation Security Advisory Committee (ASAC)
Security Baseline Working Group issued a series of recommendations that formed
the basis for FAA’s effort to strengthen aviation security in response to this need.
Recommendations issued by the working group regarding air cargo security included
tightening the definition of a “known shipper”; using profiles to review the shipments
of known shippers and apply additional security measures; and exploring
technologies to develop a profile to be applied to cargo shipments.  The White House
Commission on Aviation Safety and Security, formed after the 1996 crash of TWA
Flight 800 and commonly referred to as the Gore Commission, urged the adoption
of the recommendations made by the FAA’s Baseline Working Group regarding the
profiling of “known” and “unknown”shippers.33  As part of FAA’s efforts in air cargo
safety and security, a “known shipper” program was subsequently established,
outlining procedures for freight forwarders and air carriers to review the security
practices of known frequent customers and establish a cargo security plan for
handling cargo from known and unknown shippers.  With the passage of ATSA,
oversight of cargo security measures was transferred from the FAA to the TSA.  The
TSA has continued to rely on known shipper programs as a principle means for pre-
screening air cargo.
A review of aviation security after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks by
the Department of Transportation (DOT) Office of the Inspector General, drew
attention to the vulnerabilities of air cargo and questioned the overall effectiveness
of the known shipper program.34  In Congressional testimony following the terrorist
attacks of September 11, 2001, DOT Inspector General, Kenneth Mead, referenced
a 1998 report by the DOT Office of the Inspector General documenting a high rate
of non-compliance with hazardous materials regulations and cargo security
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requirements across the air cargo industry and a lack of industry oversight to ensure
that security procedures were carried out by cargo workers.35  In 1998, the DOT
Inspector General noted that FAA was making progress toward improving the
policies, procedures, and controls over air cargo safety and security.36  However,
Mead testified that a follow-up audit revealed continued weaknesses in FAA’s policy
for allowing cargo on passenger aircraft.  Several loopholes have been noted,
including the relative ease of obtaining known shipper status, and the relative ease
with which someone could pose as a known shipper by falsifying or counterfeiting
shipping documents used to identify the source as a known shipper.37  
Two main issues regarding the current implementation of known shipper
programs are the adequacy of procedures for auditing and monitoring known shippers
and the current lack of a consolidated database of known shippers.  Critics of existing
known shipper programs argue that currently very little investigation of known
shippers is required to demonstrate that these shippers are trustworthy and have
adequate security measures in place to ensure the integrity of their shipments.38
Freight forwarders and air carriers have also questioned why extensive background
checks and established relations with a particular customer are required to establish
that the customer is a known shipper when that customer is already considered a
known shipper to another air carrier or freight forwarder.  Therefore, some have
suggested a standardized, centralized database of known shippers.  To address these
concerns, the TSA has instituted an industry-wide pilot program database of known
shippers which is presently used by about one-third of the industry.  The TSA has
issued a proposed rule that would make using the consolidated known shipper
database an industry-wide requirement.  This move by the administration is largely
in step with language passed by the Senate during the 108th Congress (see S. 165, S.
2845 as passed by the Senate).  The administration’s initiatives in drafting regulatory
action to require an industry-wide known shipper datatbase led Congress to
ultimately drop the Senate-passed provision in the Intelligence Reform Act of 2004
(P.L. 108-458) that would have established a statutory requirement for establishing
a standardized industry-wide known shipper program and database.  Congress instead
settled on including language calling for the TSA to finalize its rulemaking on air
cargo security, including the proposed establishment of the industry-wide known
shipper database, by September 2005.  However, despite this mandate,  the TSA has
not finalized and implemented the proposed rules to date. The Congressional Budget
Office (CBO) estimates that it will cost about $10 million per year to maintain an
industry-wide database of known shippers.39
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Cargo Inspection.  Another issue for air cargo security is the adequacy of
cargo inspection procedures and oversight of cargo inspections at air carrier and
freight forwarder facilities.  ATSA established requirements for screening and
inspection of all individuals, goods, property, vehicles, and other equipment entering
a secured area of a passenger airport that assures the same level of protection as
passenger and baggage screening.  
ATSA did not establish specific requirements for the screening of air cargo.
With regard to air cargo, current regulations specify that  aircraft operators must use
the procedures, facilities, and equipment described in their security program to
prevent or deter the carriage of unauthorized explosives or incendiaries in cargo
onboard a passenger aircraft and inspect cargo shipments for such devices before it
is loaded onto passenger aircraft.  Additionally, aircraft operators must establish
controls over cargo shipments, in accordance with their security program, that
prevent the carriage of unauthorized explosive or incendiary devices aboard
passenger aircraft and access by unauthorized individuals.  Aircraft operators must
refuse to transport any cargo presented by a shipper that refuses to consent to a search
and inspection of their shipment.40  The Homeland Security Appropriations Act of
2005 (P.L. 108-334) calls for tripling the amount of cargo placed on passenger
airplanes that is screened or inspected, however the absolute number or percentage
of cargo subject to inspection is considered security sensitive.  With regard to all-
cargo aircraft, ATSA mandates that a system to screen, inspect, or otherwise ensure
the security of all-cargo aircraft is to be established as soon as practicable, but sets
no specific deadlines or time frame for compliance. 
A significant challenge regarding cargo inspection is the feasibility of
implementing inspection procedures that offer adequate assurances for security
without unduly affecting cargo shipment schedules and processes.  In 1997, the Gore
Commission recommended that unaccompanied express packages shipped on
commercial passenger aircraft should be subject to examination by explosives
detection systems.41  However, most experts agree that current technology does not
offer a readily available, affordable solution for scanning cargo containers or cargo
unit loading devices (ULDs) in an expeditious manner that would not unduly affect
the schedule of air cargo operations.  Also, scanning or inspecting individual
packages is considered infeasible by many experts due to the volume of cargo
handled and the schedule demands of the air cargo business.  Therefore, most experts
agree that the most practical solution, using available technology, is the application
of physical screening and inspections on selected shipments and the use of cargo
profiling procedures such as known shipper programs to identify shipments that may
require additional screening and inspection.
Since the ability to screen and inspect cargo is limited by available technology,
flight schedules, and cargo processing demands, alternative measures for screening
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and inspection at cargo handling facilities have been suggested.  In particular, the
Gore Commission recommended a significant expansion of the use of bomb-sniffing
dogs.  Former TSA head, Admiral James Loy, testified that increased use of canine
teams may be an effective means for increasing inspections of cargo and mail.42
Canine teams may offer a viable alternative means for screening air cargo at a
relatively low cost. 
U.S. Mail Carried on Aircraft.  In fact, canine teams presently provide the
only means approved by the TSA for screening mail weighing more than one pound
that is put on passenger aircraft under a long-running pilot program in place at 11
airports.43  Mail weighing more than one pound is otherwise prohibited from carriage
aboard passenger aircraft.
The transport of U.S. mail aboard aircraft introduces unique security challenges
to prevent illegal hazardous material shipments and the introduction of explosive and
incendiary devices.  Inspecting first class, priority, and express mail prior to shipment
by air is difficult because the Postal Service regards these items as private materials
protected by the Fourth Amendment against search.44  The Postal Service has
implemented a screening process to prevent unauthorized shipments of hazardous
substances that relies on customer screening by postal clerks who are trained to
question individuals shipping  packages weighing more than one pound by air.  Items
weighing less than one pound, on the other hand, are not subject to any inquiry and
can be deposited in mailboxes thereby precluding any inquiry of the sender.
However, only a small percentage of this mail is shipped by air.  About 5 to 7.5
percent of all domestic mail shipments, regardless of weight, are transported by either
passenger or all-cargo aircraft.  Federal Express is the largest carrier of U.S. mail and
its all-cargo operations account for about half of the total volume of U.S. mail
shipments by air.45
In 1997, the Gore Commission recommended that the Postal Service obtain
authorization from customers shipping mail weighing more than one pound allowing
examination by explosive detection systems, and if necessary, seek appropriate
legislation to accomplish this.46  Since September 11, 2001, postal shipments
weighing more than one pound have been limited to all-cargo aircraft.  Passenger air
carriers have been pushing to have these restrictions lifted because of a significant
loss of revenue from U.S. mail shipments.   Items weighing less than one pound
shipped by U.S. mail are not subject to this restriction from carriage aboard passenger
airliners. As seen in Figure 3, there was a precipitous decline in mail shipments by
passenger airlines that resulted from this restriction.  While all-cargo air carriers have
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increased their mail carriage to some degree in response, most of the mail once
carried aboard passenger aircraft is now being transported by other modes. 
Source: CRS analysis of Bureau of Transportation Statistics, Air Carrier Statistics (Form
41 Traffic).  
Assuring the safety and security of U.S. mail transported by aircraft, and
preventing the introduction of explosives or incendiaries in mail shipped by aircraft
while maintaining privacy rights of postal patrons remains an important issue in the
debate over air cargo security.  Following the events of September 11, 2001 and the
Postal Service anthrax incidents, the Technology Subcommittee of the President’s
Commission on the United States Postal Service recommended that the Postal
Service, in coordination with the Department of  Homeland Security, should explore
technologies and procedures for utilizing unique sender identification on all mail.47
Such procedures may provide a means of pre-screening all mail shipped by air,
including packages weighing less than one pound.  
Physical Security of Air Cargo Facilities
Air cargo facilities present unique challenges for physical security.  The large
physical size of these facilities and relatively continuous high-volume cargo























Figure 3. Domestic Mail Carried on Scheduled Passenger Airlines
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access areas around aircraft.  Key issues regarding physical security of these air cargo
facilities include the adequacy of:
! Inspections and oversight of air cargo facilities to ensure compliance
with aviation security regulations and procedures established in the
approved security programs of air carriers and freight forwarders;
! Training for air cargo personnel with regard to security procedures
and guidelines; and
! Access control requirements for personnel with access to air cargo
facilities and aircraft.
Inspection and Oversight of Air Cargo Facilities.   Current regulations
specify that all air carriers and freight forwarders must allow the TSA to conduct
inspections and to review and copy records in order to determine compliance with
applicable laws and regulations pertaining to aviation security.  The Homeland
Security Appropriations Act for FY2005 provided the TSA with $40 million to hire
an additional 100 inspectors and carry out oversight and enforcement activities
related to air cargo security.  The TSA has responded by launching focused
inspections of air cargo operations and conducting monthly “blitz” audits or “strikes”
of selected air cargo facilities. In FY2006, Congress again provided the TSA with a
$10 million set-aside to hire 100 more air cargo inspectors and for travel related to
carrying out regulatory oversight and inspections of air cargo shipping and handling
facilities.  
The ability to maintain this increased oversight of air cargo facilities is likely to
be highly dependent on the continued availability of resources and funding.  The
effectiveness of this oversight will also likely be highly dependent on the adequacy
of available tools and procedures to track needed corrective actions and ensure
compliance among air carriers and freight forwarders.  Therefore, the adequacy of
TSA’s oversight of air cargo security could be a significant area of focus for
congressional oversight during the 109th Congress.
Cargo Security Training.  Currently, air cargo handlers are not required to
receive any specific or formal training on security procedures or identification of
suspicious activities. However, air cargo handlers may be considered the front line
in protecting against security threats by adhering to procedures that would mitigate
physical security breaches at cargo operations facilities, and by increasing their
awareness of suspicious activities and knowing the proper procedures for reporting
their observations.  Security training for cargo workers may focus on security
procedures for ensuring cargo integrity, protecting facilities, reporting suspicious
activities, and so on.  Under TSA’s proposed rulemaking, workers for all-cargo
carriers and for indirect air carriers with security-related duties — such as carrying
out security inspections of shipments — would be required to receive specific
training on the company’s security program and their individual security-related
responsibilities under that program.  Similar training is already required of workers
for passenger airlines that are assigned security-related duties.
Increased Control over Access to Aircraft and Cargo Facilities.
Under ATSA, TSA was directed to work with airport operators to strengthen access
control points in secured areas and was authorized to use biometric screening
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procedures to positively identify individuals with access to secure airport areas.
ATSA contains provisions for TSA oversight of secured-area access control to assess
and enforce compliance with access control requirements.  These requirements
include screening and inspection of individuals, goods, property, vehicles and other
equipment seeking to access secure airport areas.  Background checks for individuals
having access to passenger aircraft are required and vendors with direct access to
airfields where passenger operations take place are required to have a TSA-approved
security program in place.  Presently, background checks and displayed identification
serve as the principal means for screening airport workers including cargo handlers.
There has been growing concern over the adequacy of these procedures for
screening and monitoring airport workers.  One particular concern is the integrity of
airport worker credentials and the potential that unauthorized individuals could gain
access to secure areas of the airport using stolen or fraudulent identification.  TSA
currently has ongoing contracts to conduct field tests of various technologies for
transportation worker identification, including biometric markers, in an effort to
develop a common and universally recognized Transportation Workers Identification
Credential (TWIC).  Biometric technology has received considerable attention from
Congress as a means to authenticate individuals, particularly airport workers, and
improve access controls to secured areas of airports.  These proposals are discussed
in further detail below in the section titled Biometric Screening Technology.  
Another concern has been raised over the use of identification checks in lieu of
physical screening of airport workers, including cargo handlers.  Representative Peter
DeFazio recently expressed concern over this practice noting that workers who
bypass physical screening could potentially carry threat objects into secured areas of
the airport or on board aircraft.48  Congress may consider whether existing security
procedures regarding airport worker access to secured airport areas meets the intent
of ATSA with regard to providing at least the same level of protection of secured
airport areas and passenger aircraft as screening passengers and their baggage.
In addition to ongoing concerns over access controls around passenger aircraft,
access control and monitoring of workers at all-cargo facilities remains a significant
challenge.  While all-cargo operators have various security measures in place to
control access to their facilities and monitor operations areas, there is no existing
regulatory framework regarding the security of all-cargo operations.  Proposed
regulations would establish an all-cargo security program detailing the physical
security measures for  air cargo operations areas, cargo placed aboard all-cargo
aircraft, and background checks and screening of individuals having access to their
aircraft on the ground or in flight.  In addition, the proposed rules would require
airports to designate cargo operations areas, including areas where all-cargo aircraft
are loaded and unloaded, as security identification display areas (SIDAs).  This
would effectively elevate the security measures for these cargo handling areas and
would require that workers with unescorted access to these areas be vetted through
fingerprint based criminal history records check as is presently done for workers
having access to secured areas around passenger aircraft.
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Arming All-Cargo Pilots.  During the 108th Congress, proponents for arming
all-cargo pilots urged Congress to allow all-cargo pilots to join the ranks of passenger
airline pilots who can volunteer for selection and training in the Federal Flight Deck
Officers (FFDO) program.  This program, established by the Homeland Security Act
of 2002 (P.L. 107-296),  trains and deputizes qualified  pilots to carry firearms and
use deadly force to protect the flight deck against terrorist attacks (see CRS Report
RL31674, Arming Pilots Against Terrorism: Implementation Issues for the Federal
Flight Deck Officer Program, by Bartholomew Elias).  While the plan was originally
limited to only pilots of passenger airliners, Vision 100 (P.L. 108-176) expanded the
program to allow cargo pilots and flight engineers to participate as well.  
Proponents for including all-cargo pilots in the program point out that all-cargo
aircraft lack hardened cockpit doors, federal air marshals, and passengers that may
assist in thwarting a hijacking attempt.49  They also point out that  physical security
and access control to cargo operations areas and all-cargo aircraft is lax compared to
the tight screening of passengers and baggage since September 11, 2001, and the
current lack of screening of individuals and property at these sites could offer the
opportunity for terrorists plotting to hijack an aircraft to board an all-cargo aircraft
as stowaways and seize the cockpit in flight.  All-cargo aircraft include more than
1,000 transport category jet airplanes, of which about half are wide-body jets similar
to those used in the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks.50  Proponents for arming
all-cargo pilots contend that the provision in Vision 100 that includes cargo pilots in
the FFDO program will mitigate the risk of a hijacking aboard all-cargo aircraft.
They further argue that training for cargo pilots is needed expediently given the
limited measures currently in place to mitigate this risk.
Cargo airlines, on the other hand, had opposed allowing their pilots to join the
FFDO program.  Air carriers, in general, have been hesitant about the program
because of  liability concerns even though specific liability protections were extended
to the airlines and pilot participants when the FFDO program was established under
the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-296).  Proponents for the program and
the inclusion of cargo pilots in the program have voiced concerns that the manner in
which the program has been implemented and the remoteness of the training facilities
have limited the program’s overall effectiveness. The program received $27 million
for FY2006 and few, if any, changes to the program are expected in the near term.
Nontheless, Congress may address some lingering concerns over the program such
as the convenience of training and requalification sites, the carriage of firearms
outside the cockpit which is presently highly restricted, and program liability
surrounding the role of the federal flight deck officer as both an airline pilot and a
deputized federal officer.
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Technology For Air Cargo Security
Because the capability of available technology is seen as a significant
constraining factor on the ability to screen, inspect, and track cargo, initiatives to
improve cargo screening technology have been a focus of recent legislation to
enhance air cargo security.  
In response to the 9/11 Commission recommendation that the TSA intensify its
efforts to identify, track, and appropriately screen potentially dangerous cargo, the
National Intelligence Reform Act of 2004 (P.L. 108-458) directs the TSA to develop
technologies for this purpose and authorizes $100 million annually in FY2005
through FY2007 for the research, development, and deployment of enhanced air
cargo security technology.  The act also establishes a competitive grant program to
foster the development of advanced air cargo security technology.
Appropriations for research and development of technologies specifically
tailored for air cargo security had increased significantly, totaling $55 million in
FY2004 and $75 million for FY2005.  In FY2006, TSA research and development
functions were realigned into the Department of Homeland Security’s Science and
Technology Directorate and research and development funding for air cargo was
scaled back to $30 million, and specifically designated for conducting three cargo
screening pilot programs testing different concepts of operation. 
Various technologies are under consideration for enhancing the security of air
cargo operations.51  Tamper-evident and tamper resistant packaging and container
seals may offer a relatively low cost means of protecting cargo integrity during
shipping and handling.  Cargo screening technology using x-rays, chemical trace
detection systems, or possibly neutron beams or other techniques may offer means
to screen cargo prior to placement aboard aircraft.  Additionally, canine teams may
be used to augment cargo screening technology or to screen cargo independently.
Hardened cargo container technology may be used to mitigate the threat of in-flight
explosions or incendiary fires aboard aircraft.  Finally, biometric technologies are
being evaluated and may be useful in authenticating cargo worker identification and
improving access control to aircraft and cargo operations areas.
Tamper-Evident and Tamper-Resistant Seals.  Various technologies
exist for sealing cargo shipments and cargo containers to prevent tampering.
Relatively low cost solutions such as tamper-evident tapes that provide visual
indications of tampering are readily available and could easily be implemented during
packaging.  Such technology could be used in combination with “known shipper”
protocols to insure that known shippers provide sufficient security in their packaging
facilities and deter tampering during shipping and handling.  Tamper-evident tape
can identify cargo during inspections processes for further screening and inspection
to safeguard against the introduction of explosives and incendiary devices.  Tamper-
evident tape may also be an effective tool to deter cargo crime, including cargo theft
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and the introduction of contraband, counterfeit, and pirated goods during shipment.
At cargo handling facilities, tamper evident seals and locks can be utilized on
cargo containers to prevent theft and the introduction of contraband or threat objects
into air cargo shipments.  Electronic seals may serve as an additional deterrent to
terrorist and criminal activity by providing more immediate detection of tampering.
Electronic seals have alarms, some triggered by fiber optic cable loops, that activate
a transmitted signal when tampered with.52  Electronic seals cost about $2,500 per
unit, but are reusable.  However, the utility of electronic seals in air cargo operations
has been questioned by some experts because currently available electronic seals
have a limited transmission range which may make detecting and identifying seals
that have been tampered with difficult.  In addition, there is some concern that they
may interfere with aircraft electronic systems.53
In addition to tamper-evident and tamper-resistant seals, technologies to better
track cargo shipments are being considered to maintain better control and tracking
of cargo shipments along the supply chain.  Both global positioning system (GPS)
and radio-frequency identification (RFID) technologies are seen as emerging
technologies for improving the tracking of air cargo in the supply chain.
Cargo Screening Technology.  Various technologies are available for
detecting explosives, incendiary devices, and the presence of various chemical and
biological agents and nuclear weapons in cargo.  Key technologies under
consideration for screening air cargo for threat objects include x-ray screening, x-ray
based explosive detection systems, chemical trace detection systems, and
technologies based on neutron beams.  In addition to these technological approaches,
several experts and TSA officials have been advocating and pursuing an increased
use of canine teams for screening cargo and mail.  The main drawback to any of these
screening techniques is that the screening process takes time and may significantly
impact cargo delivery schedules.  While the various technologies differ in their
capabilities and performance, in general, more detailed screening analyses require
more time and could affect cargo throughput.  Another concern regarding these
technologies is the cost associated with acquisition, operation, and maintenance of
screening systems.
X-Ray Screening.  The most common systems currently available for large-
scale screening of cargo shipments utilize x-ray technology.  These systems rely on
well understood transmission and backscatter x-ray techniques to probe cargo
containers.  Many of these systems utilize low-dose x-ray sources that emit narrow
x-ray beams thus virtually eliminating the need for shielding.  These devices are
compact and light weight, thus allowing them to be mounted on moving platforms
that can scan over containers.54  X-ray devices are becoming more common at major
ports of entry, border crossings, and airports overseas as post-September 11th security
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concerns are spurring increased development and deployment of these devices.  The
systems are being utilized to screen for drugs and other contraband as well as
explosives in cargo shipments.
One of the most significant operational challenges in using x-ray screening
devices is the performance of the human operator.  A variety of human factors
considerations contribute to the operator’s ability to detect threat objects when
viewing x-ray images.  These include the monotony of the task, fatigue, time
pressure, the adequacy of training, and working conditions.  These human factors are
important to consider in fielding x-ray screening systems to ensure high detection
rates of threat objects while minimizing false alarm rates that would unnecessarily
slow the cargo inspection and handling process.  Technologies such as threat image
projection (TIP), that superimpose stored images of threat objects on x-ray scans can
help keep operators alert and may be effective tools for training and performance
monitoring. Additional technologies, such as computer algorithms for highlighting
potential threat objects, may also be considered to aid human observers.
Explosive Detection Systems.  Currently, explosive detection systems
(EDS) are being used extensively in the aviation security environment, particularly
in response to the mandate in ATSA requiring screening of all checked passenger
baggage by EDS.  These systems use x-ray computed tomography (CT) to scan
objects, and computational algorithms that assess the probability of threat object
detection based on object density characteristics.  Certified EDS systems must meet
acceptable detection and false alarm rates for bulk explosives detection.  While most
specific performance criteria of certified EDS systems are classified, EDS systems
used for passenger checked baggage must meet or exceed a throughput rate of 450
bags per hour.  
In 1997, the Gore Commission specifically recommended that unaccompanied
express packages carried on passenger aircraft should be subject to EDS
examination,55 however to date this recommendation has not been acted upon by
regulatory agencies and has not been proposed in legislation.  Undoubtedly, the TSA
has gained considerable experience with the large scale deployment and use of EDS
equipment to meet the mandate for full explosives detection screening of checked
passenger bags.  Many of the lessons learned by TSA from this experience will be
useful for assessing the technical and operational challenges of applying large-scale
EDS screening initiatives for air cargo operations.  Efforts are also underway at TSA
to improve the performance of EDS equipment and reduce its cost.  However, air
cargo operations are likely to present some of their own unique challenges for
implementing large scale EDS screening of freight, express packages, and mail.
Some of the potential operational challenges associated with effectively fielding EDS
equipment for screening air cargo include:
! The limited size of objects that can be placed in EDS machines
which would require objects to be  screened before being placed in
containers or on pallets;
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! The distributed nature of the air cargo system often involves loading
containers at remote sites, and EDS screening at these remote sites
may leave the system vulnerable to possible introduction of
explosives or incendiary devices at points along the supply chain
beyond the screening site;
! Reported high false alarm rates of current generation EDS systems
may lead to high levels of secondary screening and detailed
inspections that could impact the ability to meet the schedule
demands of cargo operations; and
! The processing rate of current generation EDS equipment may
require the purchase of large numbers of EDS machines, thus
increasing program costs, to minimize the impact on cargo
operations scheduling and meet desired security program goals (e.g.,
reaching a desired percentage of cargo that is screened by EDS).
 
Chemical Trace Detection Systems.  Chemical trace detection systems,
referred to commonly as explosive trace detection (ETD) devices are being widely
used as secondary screening tools for passenger carry-on and checked baggage.
Items identified for closer scrutiny by initial screening methods or selected at random
may undergo further examination using these systems.  These systems use a variety
of technical principles to analyze the chemical composition of sample residue wiped
from suspect articles.  These systems compare the chemical composition of such a
sample to the signature of known explosive materials and signal an alarm to the
operator if the probability of a match exceeds a specified threshold.
The use of chemical trace detection systems is now common practice in the
screening of checked and carry-on bags.  It has been reported that TSA is considering
expanding the use of chemical trace detection systems for screening cargo carried
aboard passenger aircraft.56  However, screening procedures using these systems is
very labor intensive and time consuming.  Like the manner in which this technology
is used to perform secondary screening of checked and carry on bags, chemical trace
detection may be employed in air cargo operations to perform detailed screening of
suspicious packages identified through known shipper databases, or can be used for
detailed secondary screening in conjunction with primary screening performed by x-
ray and EDS systems similar to procedures currently in use for checked baggage
screening.  Random screening of cargo using chemical trace detection systems as a
primary screening method is unlikely to be effective given the very low percentage
of cargo that could be screened using this technique without significantly impacting
cargo operations schedules.
Neutron Beam Technologies.  Another potential class of technologies for
screening air cargo is based on neutron beams.  These systems use a pulsed neutron
generator to probe an object, initiating several low energy nuclear reactions with the
chemical elements comprising the object.  Detectors can then measure the nuclear
signature of the transmitted neutrons and/or the gamma-rays emitted from the
reactions.  Since neutrons and gamma-rays have the ability to penetrate through
various materials to large depths in a non-intrusive manner, neutron technologies
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may have advantages for cargo screening, and some of these technologies are
currently being operationally evaluated for use in contraband and explosives
detection.57  However, the GAO noted that currently available neutron-based
technologies cost about $10 million per machine and require about one hour per
container for screening thus making this option very expensive and time
consuming.58  
In addition to the cost and time factors associated with neutron beam
technologies, the National Research Council (NRC) has raised considerable doubts
about performance capabilities for screening the full spectrum of cargo containers or
pallets for explosives.59  The NRC also expressed potential safety concerns over the
use of radiation-producing particle accelerators, and expressed concerns over the
practicality of using this technology in the aviation environment because of the size
and weight of the equipment.  
In 1999, the NRC advised the FAA against further funding for research,
development, and deployment of a neutron-based explosive detection system known
as pulsed fast/thermal neutron spectroscopy (PFTNS) for primary screening of
carry-on baggage, checked baggage, or cargo citing low current explosive threat
levels and inadequate performance.  In 2002, the NRC concluded that another
neutron-based technique, pulsed fast neutron analysis (PFNA), is not ready for airport
deployment or testing.  However, the NRC conceded that PFNA has greater potential
for screening containerized cargo that any other technology currently under
consideration.60
Because the perceived threat of explosives has increased since September 11,
2001, neutron-based detection technology continues to be mentioned as a possible
means for screening air cargo.  However, wide-scale deployment of this technology
for air cargo security in the near term seems unlikely.
Hardened Cargo Containers.  In addition to cargo screening technology,
hardened cargo container technology is being considered as a means to mitigate the
threat of an explosion or fire caused by a bomb or incendiary device that makes its
way onto an aircraft undetected. The 9/11 Commission formally recommended the
deployment of at least one hardened cargo container on every passenger aircraft that
also hauls cargo to carry suspicious cargo.61  The National Intelligence Reform Act
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of 2004 (P.L. 108-248) requires the TSA to establish a pilot program to explore the
feasibility of this concept and authorizes the use of incentives to airlines to offset
added fuel, maintenance, and other operational costs associated with using hardened
cargo containers in an effort to encourage voluntary participation in the pilot
program. The act authorizes $2 million to conduct the pilot program, however no
funding has been appropriated for this purpose so far.
In fact, the concept of deploying hardened cargo containers has been a topic of
ongoing research for some time.  Following the December 21, 1988 bombing of Pan
Am flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland, the British Air Accident Investigation
Branch recommended that regulatory authorities and airplane manufacturers study
methods to mitigate the effects of in-flight explosions.62  The FAA has had a active
research program in blast resistant containers for more than 10 years examining the
airworthiness, ground handling, and blast resistance of hardened containers which is
now overseen by the TSA’s Transportation Security Laboratory.  These containers,
or hardened unit-loading devices (HULDs), are seen as a potential means for
mitigating the threat of explosives placed aboard passenger aircraft in either checked
baggage or cargo.  These containers  must withhold an explosive blast of a specified
magnitude without any rupturing or fragment penetration of the container wall or the
aircraft structure, and must contain and “self-extinguish” any post-blast fire in order
to meet the FAA-established test criteria.63  
However, the increased weight of these containers could have significant
operational impacts on airlines by increasing fuel costs and decreasing payload
capacity for carrying revenue passengers and cargo.  Challenges associated with
deploying hardened cargo containers include:
! Increased weight affecting aircraft range and payload capacity;
! Increased procurement cost for hardened containers;
! Potentially higher maintenance costs for hardened container
materials;
! Potential reduction in cargo volume (in addition to reduced payload
weight) due to thicker container walls; and
! Possible design specifications, such as door hinging and positioning,
that are not compatible with current airline baggage and cargo
loading procedures and operations facilities.64
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The National Research Council (NRC) estimated that the per unit cost for acquiring
hardened cargo containers would be $10,000, and recommended that the FAA
continue efforts to operationally test HULDs and establish more rigorous protocol for
certifying HULDs, but should not deploy them unless deemed to be a necessary
security measure based on the assessments of cost, operational, and deployment
studies by FAA and other stakeholders.
The NRC panel also recommended further economic assessment of their
proposed deployment plan for fielding one HULD per wide-body aircraft.  The NRC
panel also noted that research and development on the use of HULDs on narrow-
body aircraft was lagging far behind the work done on wide-body aircraft, and
recommended an increased emphasis on research in this area to assess the operational
effectiveness of HULDs in narrow-body aircraft before any further recommendations
could be made.  The NRC panel estimated that the cost of deploying enough HULDS
for airlines to carry at least one HULD per passenger flight would require an
industry-wide procurement cost of $125 million, and would create an annual
industry-wide economic impact of $11 million in increased fuel burn and reduced
payload revenue.65
The recommendation made by the 9/11 Commission calls for the deployment
of at least one hardened cargo container on every passenger aircraft for carrying any
suspect cargo.66  This recommendation implies that a cargo pre-screening or risk
evaluation process such as a known shipper program would be used to determine
what cargo should be loaded into the hardened container.  Presently, ATSA requires
shipments from unknown sources to travel on all-cargo aircraft.  The known-shipper
program is the currently implemented risk-based tool for determining what cargo
must be kept off  passenger flights.  One strategic objective of the TSA’s Air Cargo
Strategic Plan is to develop a means for identifying elevated risk cargo through pre-
screening.67  Such a tool would likely be needed to assess risk and determine what
cargo should be placed in a hardened container.  Besides the need for a pre-screening
process, the use of hardened cargo containers is likely to be opposed by the airline
industry because of the direct costs of acquiring these units as well as the increased
operational cost associated with increased fuel burn and lost payload capacity.  The
benefits of using hardened cargo containers would likely be highly dependent on the
security of the pre-screening process and its ability  to detect high risk cargo since the
benefits of a hardened container would largely be negated if the pre-screening process
could be circumvented by terrorists.  A key policy issue that is likely to emerge as the
feasibility of hardened cargo containers is further evaluated is the potential
implications of allowing suspicious cargo to travel on passenger aircraft even if this
cargo is secured in hardened cargo containers.  In other words, policymakers may
debate what the risks and benefits of loading suspicious cargo on passenger airplanes
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in hardened cargo containers is as compared to the alternative of offloading this
suspicious cargo to all-cargo aircraft.
In any case, under a plan in which only one hardened cargo container is
deployed per aircraft, it is likely that only a relatively small fraction of available
cargo space will be reinforced.  For example, a Boeing 747-400 passenger jet is
capable of holding up to 13 full-width, or 26 half-width containers.68  Thus, providing
just one full sized hardened cargo container for a 747-400 would provide
reinforcement for less than 10% of the available cargo storage area.  While a greater
percentage of available cargo space on smaller jets could be protected by hardened
containers, any policy regarding the use of just one hardened container per aircraft
will likely need to carefully evaluate the criteria and methods for vetting cargo to
determine what cargo should be designated for carriage inside these hardened cargo
containers.
Biometric Screening Technology.  Provisions of ATSA give the TSA
authority to use biometric technology to verify the identity of employees entering the
secured areas of airports and directed the TSA to review the effectiveness of
biometrics systems currently used by airports such as San Francisco International
Airport.  Additionally, the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-
295) requires the issuance of biometric transportation security cards for identity
authentication of individuals with background checks for entry to any secured area
of a vessel or facility.  The TSA’s approach to meet these various mandates is
through the establishment of a universal Transportation Worker Identification
Credential (TWIC) to be used across all transportation modes for any personnel
requiring unescorted access to secure areas of the national transportation system.69
The proposed TWIC Program is currently under evaluation at two regional pilot sites:
the Philadelphia/Delaware River and Los Angeles/Long Beach ports.  Available
biometric technologies such as fingerprint, retinal scan, and facial pattern recognition
are being evaluated in the current operational evaluation phase of the TWIC program.
It is likely that system-wide deployment of a common transportation worker
credentialing system will evolve from this program and could be applied to improve
access control to air cargo operations areas and cargo handling facilities.
The National Intelligence Reform Act of 2004 (P.L. 108-458) contains extensive
provisions requiring the TSA to develop specific guidance for the use of biometric
or other technologies for airport access control systems by March 31, 2005.  The
guidance is to include comprehensive technical and operating system requirements
and performance standards for the use of biometric identifier technology in airport
access control systems; a list of products and vendors meeting these specifications;
and specific procedures for implementing biometric identifier systems; and a
discussion of best practices for incorporating biometric identifier technologies into
airport access control systems.  The act also provides authorization for $20 million
for the research and development of advanced biometric technology applications for
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aviation security.  Given the proposed regulatory changes to enhance access controls
to all-cargo facilities and improve existing access controls around passenger aircraft,
it is likely that the implementation of biometric identifier technology will play an
increasingly important role in air cargo security policy.
Funding for Air Cargo Security
 The cost of air cargo security options are significant to both the Federal
government and the air cargo industry.  Furthermore, the indirect costs of air cargo
security on air cargo operations may pose significant long-term challenges.  On the
other hand, the potential costs of a terrorist attack, both in terms of the loss of life and
property and the long term economic impacts may also be significant but are difficult
to predict and quantify.  An ongoing debate tied to air cargo appropriations and
oversight of aviation security is the amount of physical screening and inspection of
air cargo that is needed and achievable and whether risk-based pre-screening tools
can provide an adequate means to ensure the security of air cargo by identifying at-
risk cargo for targeted physical inspections.  Besides the logistic complexities of
inspecting large amounts or 100% of cargo on passenger flights, many are concerned
that the cost of doing so outweighs the potential benefit, especially given the
capabilities of current screening systems.
While expenditures on air cargo security measures have been growing over the
past two years, these efforts are a relatively small element (about 2%) of  TSA’s
overall operating budget for aviation security.  While these expenditures are presently
a small component of the overall cost for aviation security, they could continue to
grow if additional technology and resources are devoted to the tracking and screening
of cargo shipments.  In contrast to passenger and baggage screening which are, with
few exceptions, the operational responsibility of the TSA, under the current scheme,
much of the cost of inspection and screening of cargo is borne by the airlines and
shippers, while TSA only maintains oversight responsibility.  If 100% inspections of
air cargo were made mandatory as some have proposed, TSA estimates that this
could result in a cost of more than $650 million in the first year of implementation.70
To address concerns over funding such an initiative, some past legislative proposals
calling for the TSA to physically screen all cargo shipments bound for passenger
aircraft incorporated a fee schedule for shippers to cover costs associated with
screening cargo transported in passenger aircraft that is similar to the security service
fee imposed on airline passengers (see H.R. 2455 and H.R. 3798 introduced in the
108th Congress).  Imposing a fee on air cargo shipments for security could provide
offsetting collections for security costs.  Regardless of how such a fee is collected —
either through fees assessed to air carriers or freight forwarders or through direct fees
applied to each shipment — the costs will ultimately be borne by shippers and
ultimately passed on to the customers of their products.  The overall impact of fees
on air cargo is dependent on the relative cost of the fee.  Since air cargo shipments
tend to consist of relatively high value goods, it is likely that the relative cost of a
security fee in relation to the value of the shipment will be low which would
minimize the economic impact of imposing such a fee.  However, if fees applied to
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air cargo carried on passenger aircraft are higher than fees for transporting that same
cargo on all-cargo aircraft, a significant impact on passenger air carrier revenues from
cargo may result.  Equity in fee collections will likely be an important consideration
in assessing if and how air cargo security fees should be collected.
Another possible concern over the increased cost of cargo security and proposals
to impose fees on shippers is the potential to increase shipment costs related to
manufacturing, particularly the distribution of time-critical parts.  If unit shipping
costs rise enough because of security-related costs and fees, it is possible that
domestic manufacturing and assembly costs will not be able to remain competitive
in a global market.  For example, if the costs of shipping time-critical parts from Asia
for final assembly in the United States rise because of security-related fees, it may
become cost advantageous to manufacture the entire product overseas.  In the long
term, this could result in a possible loss of manufacturing jobs in the United States.
For this reason, the economic implications of any proposal to impose security-related
fees on air cargo will likely need to be carefully evaluated to avoid or minimize any
unintended impacts on manufacturers and their suppliers.
While Congress continues to debate the needed level of physical screening and
inspection of cargo, current appropriations figures are predicated on continuing and
expanding the risk-based approach of pre-screening cargo and conducting targeted
inspections of elevated-risk cargo and increasing random inspections of other
shipments.  In FY2003, the TSA received $20 million for cargo screening
improvements.  For FY2004, the TSA was appropriated $30 million for air cargo
security operations.  Additionally, research and development related to air cargo
security was appropriated $55 million.  For FY2005, the Administration
recommended flat funding for air cargo, while the House and the Senate agreed to
increases to both the air cargo operations and air cargo research and development
accounts totaling $115 million.  In FY2006, there was a shift in funding with, for the
first time, a larger proportion being allocated to air cargo operations ($55 million) as
compared to research and development ($30 million)  (see Table 1).  Also, as
previously noted, the FY2006 air cargo research and development funding has been
more specifically directed to focus on three pilot projects.  This may reflect a
maturation in the approach to air cargo screening and inspections in the near term
with technologies and approaches being migrated from purely a research activity to
an operational concept.
Table 1.  Appropriations for Air Cargo Security ($ in millions)
Air cargo security FY2004 FY2005 FY2006
Operations: 30.0 40.0 55.0
Research and Development: 55.0 75.0 30.0
Total: 85.0 115.0 85.0
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Potential Congressional Approaches
Under ATSA, a mandate for screening or otherwise ensuring the security of all
cargo placed on passenger aircraft already exists.  ATSA also mandated that a system
to screen, inspect, or otherwise insure the security of cargo carried aboard all-cargo
aircraft is put in place as soon as possible.  The law gives the TSA broad authority
to carry out these requirements.  Therefore, many of the proposed cargo security
initiatives could be accomplished under existing law as reflected in the TSA’s air
cargo strategic plan and the comprehensive proposed rulemaking to enhance air cargo
security for both passenger and all-cargo operations.  While ATSA gives the
administration flexibility in meeting the mandate to screen and inspect air cargo, it
is likely that TSA will continue to rely heavily on “known shipper” programs for air
cargo security for two key reasons.  First, many of the proposed options for
increasing air cargo security, such as full cargo screening, are costly.  Second, the
potential impacts on the air cargo industry are not fully understood but could be
significant.  Therefore, any significant changes in air cargo security practices will
likely be dependent on Congressional action.  
An appropriate course of action for air cargo security was debated extensively
during the 108th Congress and continues to be a significant issue for debate and
oversight in the 109th Congress.  Initial proposals for immediate 100% screening of
all cargo shipments placed on passenger aircraft were seen by many as too complex
to implement given available technology and logistic challenges, but gave rise to
compromise language in the FY2005 Homeland Security Appropriations Act (P.L.
108-334)  calling for a tripling of physical inspections of cargo placed on passenger
aircraft and additional direction in the FY2006 Homeland Security Appropriations
Act (P.L. 109-90) requiring the TSA to increase air cargo screening and inspections
beyond this enhanced level.  Similarly, a recommendation by the 9/11 Commission
calling for the TSA to intensify its efforts to identify, track, and screen potentially
dangerous cargo and deploy hardened cargo containers led to the inclusion of
numerous provisions to enhance air cargo security technology in the National
Intelligence Reform Act of 2004 (P.L. 108-458).  Oversight of the implementation
of these provisions as well as the proposed regulatory enhancements for air cargo
security are likely to remain issues of considerable interest during the 109th Congress.
While these recent legislative actions are likely to shift the focus on air cargo
security from legislation to oversight in the near term, a variety of options for
implementing air cargo security measures continue to exist and may be revisted
during the 109th Congress.  Some possible approaches and the potential benefits and
risks associated with implementing these approaches are provided in Table 2.  In
general, for any of the listed approaches, there is a tradeoff between program costs
and potential impacts on the air cargo industry on the one hand and the level of
security that can be achieved by implementing the option on the other hand.
Currently, there are two main positions or views on air cargo security.  One position
argues that full screening of air cargo and extensive security measures would be too
costly and too disruptive to the air cargo industry to successfully implement.  The
alternative position argues that full screening and enhanced security measures are
needed to adequately mitigate the risks associated with  air cargo to the maximum
extent possible and maintain public confidence in air travel.  The current focus, as
reflected in recently enacted legislation, is to focus on intensifying air cargo security
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using available techniques, while investing in the research and development of
technology that can enhance the capability to identify, screen, and track cargo
shipments on passenger aircraft as recommended by the 9/11 Commission.
Table 2.  Potential Benefits and Possible Risks of Various
Congressional Approaches
Option Potential benefits Possible risks












flexibility to meet changing
threat levels with a relatively
small budget
• Provides limited security
that could be circumvented
• Possible over-reliance on
known shipper programs
• Limited screening of cargo
may not adequately mitigate
the risk of explosives
• Limited funds to initiate






• Could deter a variety of risks
to cargo including cargo
crime, hijacking, and sabotage
• May be difficult and costly
to provide increased physical
security
• May not mitigate the risk of
explosives introduced in pre-
packaged cargo





• Could deter terrorists from
attempting to place explosives
in air cargo
• Could mitigate cargo crime
such as theft and contraband
• Low cost solutions may be
circumvented relatively easily
• More sophisticated
solutions, such as fiber optic




access to air cargo
facilities and
aircraft
• Ensure that workers with
access to aircraft meet the
same level of security as
passengers
• Mitigate risk of weapons and
explosives introduced by
cargo workers
• Relatively high cost
• Would require additional
screeners and screening





• Deter terrorists from
attempting to place explosives
in air cargo
• Addresses the 9/11
Commission recommendation
to intensify efforts to identify,
track, and screen air cargo
• Without full screening,
explosives may not be
detected
• May impact air cargo
operations and schedules
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• Ensure that cargo placed on
passenger aircraft meets the
same level of security as
passengers and their property
• High cost
• May significantly impact air
cargo schedules
• May significantly impact air
carrier revenues from air
cargo if shipments are






• May lead to new
technologies and procedures




regarding the performance of
screening technologies
continue to exist
• Currently funded programs










• May mitigate the effect of an
in-flight explosion
• New, congressionally
mandated pilot program can
help evaluate the feasibility of
the concept with a relatively
small investment
• Effectiveness is largely
negated if the cargo pre-
screening process can be
circumvented by terrorists
• Operational costs may
prevent passenger airlines
from being cost competitive
with all-cargo carriers
